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Abstract: This article samples 293 listed companies on GEM (Growth Enterprise Market) of Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
uses SPSS 17.0 to analyze their annual report data from 2009 to 2011. The results show that corporate performance will 
increase and then decrease along with the improvement of debt asset ratio, and achieve optimized performance at about 
50%-60% of DAR (debt asset ratio); short-term borrowings have significant negative effects on corporate performance, bank 
debt, commercial credit and long-term borrowings have indistinctive positive effects on corporate performance, and other 
debt have marked positive effects on corporate performance. This research is helpful for governmental macro-control and 
SMEs themselves to build reasonable capital structure to improve their corporate performance. 
 
Keywords: GEM (Growth Enterprise Market), listed companies, debt financing, corporate performance 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the MM theory proposed in 1958, the discussion on the relationship between capital structure and 
corporate value keeps going on. From a generalized view, corporate governance aims at resolving the 
relationship among various stakeholders, the financing structure theory deems that all funds providers tend to 
advocate their own interests; therefore corporate financing structure is closely related with corporate governance. 
As an important part of the corporate finance structure, the effects of the ratio, maturity structure and changing 
of debt financing on corporate performance have become a hot topic recently. The previous research has reached 
different conclusions about governance effects of debt financing and can be classified into three categories: 
 Positive effects. It was founded Debt financing has positive affection on corporate performance[1-2]; debt 
financing inhibits the managers from abuse of cash flow to a large extent, the optimal proportions of equity and 
debt impacts greatly on the managers’ equity incentive, thereby helps reduce agency costs and maximize profits 
[3]. Some scholars hold similar points, e.g., Harris and Raviv [4], Hui Wang [5] and Ruiming Tang [6]. 
 Negative effects. It was argued by Myers [7] that to some extent debt financing caused interest conflicts 
between stockholders and creditors, increased agency costs, and thereby produced negative effects on corporate 
value. Diamond[8] studies the relationship between debt financing and reputation mechanism of corporate 
governance, he thinks the debt financing will reduce the company's operation performance. Naiping Zhu and 
Yusheng Kong[9] proves that asset-liability ratio, current debt ratio, long-term debt ratio all have a significant 
negative correlation with corporate performance, debt financing affects corporate governance effects negatively. 
 Other effects. McConnell and Servaes [10] examines the relationship between corporate performance and 
ownership structure sampling companies in different growth rate and find that corporate growth rate 
significantly affects the governance effects of debt financing. Shengjuan Yang [11] analyzed the annual report 
data of china’s private listed companies from 2001 to 2004, concluded that debt financing of private listed 
company plays a certain but very limited role of governance. Xiaoyan Cui and Mei Wang [12] sampled 723 
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China’s listed companies from 2004-2009, and pointed out that there was an inverted “U” shape relation 
between corporate performance and indicators including asset-liability ratio, long-term debt ratio and short-term 
debt ratio.  
From the above, there isn’t an accordant conclusion on the governance effects of debt financing; moreover 
in domestic related research, samples are mostly listed companies on main and SME board market, little is 
sampled on GEM (Growth Enterprise Market). In order to make up the defects of related research, this paper 
samples listed companies on GEM of Shenzhen stock exchange to research the relationship between debt 
financing and corporate performance, aiming at helping emerging SMEs to improve the potentiality of debt 
financing. 
 
2. MODEL SETTING AND VARIABLE SELECTION  
2.1 Hypothesis  
Company can improve its corporate value through reasonable capital structure and make full use of the 
governance effects of debt financing.. Managers should balance the higher personal interests against the risk of 
losing all the benefits with bankruptcy. As the possibility of enterprises bankruptcy is positively related to debt 
ratio, debt financing can be seen as an effective incentive mechanism. Yet too high asset-liability ratio will not 
only increase the risk of bankruptcy but also court enormous financial pressure which negatively impacts 
corporate performance. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis H1：In the case of normal operational and financial status, performance of GEM listed 
companies will first decrease and then increase with the increase of asset-liability ratio. 
The primary purpose of designing relationship between banks and enterprises is preventing financial risks, 
so the banks tend to impose “credit crunch” on SMEs to resist risks. Especially state-owned commercial banks 
are inclined to lend money to large and medium-sized enterprises. There are high threshold of bank loans and 
costs for a large number of SMEs. Only those outstanding ones with super performance might get small loan 
from banks to alleviate fund shortage, which would not let them have heavy burden of interest expenses. 
With the implementation of the Bills Law, as well as the development of information technology and 
improvement of credit system, commercial financing gets tremendous development in recent years. As an 
important way of short-term financing, it is the redistribution of existing capital between enterprises in forms of 
account payable, note payable and deposit received and so on. All of these are based on understanding and trust 
from each other, or it would be difficult to use. Then, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis H2: Bank debt financing, commercial credit and other liabilities of listed companies on GEM 
are positively correlated with corporate performance. 
Debt maturity structure refers to constituent structure and the respective proportion of short and long term 
debt. It is an important part of debt covenants, which specifies the rights and obligations of creditors and debtors. 
Because of difficulty for SEMs to get loan, their bank debt is mainly of short-term. For long-term debt, creditors 
face high risks, thus they may propose some restrictive terms to debtors, and have high enthusiasm to participate 
in debtors’ corporate governance. Then, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis H3: short-term debt of listed companies on GEM is positively correlated with corporate 
performance, and long-term debt is negatively correlated with corporate performance. 
 
2.2 Selection of variables  
We select data from 2009 to 2011 to carry out empirical analysis from China's economic and financial 
database (CCER). Rejecting the companies whose data is missing, sample data include 58 firms in 2009, 188 
firms in 2010 and 293 firms in 2011, totally contain 539 data samples. 
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2.2.1 Measurable indicators of corporate governance effects (explained variables) 
We select ROA, ROE, and EPS as measures of corporate performance and governance indicators. Good 
corporate governance highlights not only the greatest wealth for shareholders, but also the maximum of the 
corporate value. So the effects of corporate governance should be measured by profitability of the entire 
company's assets, profit ability of shareholders and the future operational conditions of the company. 
2.2.2 Measurable indicators of debt financing (explanatory variables) 
Debt financing is an important source of corporate finance whose function of signal transduction will 
increase the attention of investors. Here we use DAR as explanatory variable to analyze debt financing 
governance effects, considering different types of debt have different effects in corporate governance, we set BD, 
CD and ED to reflect the different types of debt sources; and SD and LD to reflect the different time limit of 
debt. 
2.2.3 The selection of control variable 
We select two control variables: (1) Company size which affects the level of corporate governance; (2) 
Industry dummy variable. As corporate performance are affected by lots of economic factors beyond control, e.g. 
industry policy, market conditions, etc. We use symbols and definitions for each variable as follows:  
Explained Variable: Return on total Assets (ROA), Rate of Return on Common Stockholders' Equity (ROE), 
Earning per Share (EPS); Explanatory Variable:Asset-liability Ratio (DAR), Bank Borrowing Rate (BD), 
Commercial Credit Rate (CD), Other Debt Ratio (ED), Short-term Debt Ratio (SD), Long-term Debt Ratio (LD); 
Control Variable: Corporate Size (Lnsize), Industry (Indus). 
Use the above variable to build mathematical models as follows: 
Model 1 (reflects the relationship between corporate performance and asset-liability ratio): 
PE = + 1 DAR+ 2
2DAR +
3 Lnsize +
11
1
i
i


 iIndus +     (1) 
Model 2 (reflects the relationship between corporate performance and bank, commercial credit, and other 
debts): 
PE = + 1 BD+ 2 CD + 3 ED+ 4 Lnsize +
11
1
i
i


 iIndus +   (2) 
Model 3 (reflects the relationship between corporate performance and short and long term debt financing): 
PE = + 1 SD + 2 LD + Lnsize +
11
1
i
i


 iIndus +            (3) 
PE  represent variables of corporate performance, including ROA, ROE and EPS; α is a constant 
(intercept), 
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , i  are coefficients; ε is random error; other variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1 Selection of variables  
Table 1 shows that ROA, ROE and EPS are 0.0759, 0.0979 and 0.7097; standard deviations are 0.0488, 
0.0745 and 0.4299, indicates little difference in ROA, ROE and EPS among these companies, and the minimum 
and maximum company size are 18.6, 22.50, mean is 20.5898, indicates little difference in company size. 
Table 2 reviews sample companies’ debt from the scale, changing and maturity structure. For asset-liability 
ratio, the maximum is 74.69%; the minimum is only 1.26%. The companies are mainly dependent on 
commercial credit, which accounts for more than 50% of the total debt financing, and bank loans only account 
for 20%. It differs a lot from listed companies on Main Board market mainly dependent on bank borrowings. 
Bank borrowings gradually decreased and commercial credit gradually increased. the short-term debt ratio 
gradually decreased, but the mean value goes beyond 90%, more than 10 times bigger than the rate of long-term 
liabilities, some companies even had no long-term liabilities, means they prefer current liabilities. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics of total sample for each variable indicator in 2009-2011 
Index N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ROA 519 0.00 0.47 0.0759 0.0488 
ROE 519 0.00 0.55 0.0979 0.0745 
EPS 519 0.00 2.78 0.7097 0.4299 
DAR 519 0.01 0.75 0.1784 0.1364 
BD 519 0.00 0.96 0.1456 0.2129 
CD 519 0.00 1.73 0.3888 0.3055 
ED 519 0.00 0.56 0.0381 0.0630 
LD 519 0.00 0.26 0.0102 0.0291 
SD 519 0.01 0.75 0.1613 0.1268 
Lnsize  519 18.68 22.50 20.5898 0.6331 
 
Table 2.  Asset-liability ratio and structure of sample companies in 2009-2011 
Year Samples Index Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
2009 58 DAR 0.0254 0.5498 0.1868 0.1310 
58 BD 0.000 0.6257 0.2261 0.2091 
58 CD 0.0454 0.9963 0.5251 0.2262 
58 ED 0.000 0.2873 0.0586 0.0740 
58 SD 0.4378 1.000 0.9214 0.1200 
58 LD 0.0000 0.5622 0.0786 0.1200 
2010 188 DAR 0.0126 0.6854 0.1761 0.1515 
188 BD 0.000 0.9285 0.1954 0.2627 
188 CD 0.0497 1.0449 0.5332 0.2662 
188 ED 0.000 0.6462 0.6302 0.0896 
188 SD 0.1659 1.0000 0.9027 0.1470 
188 LD 0.000 0.8341 0.0973 0.1470 
2011 293 DAR 0.020 0.7469 0.1766 0.1260 
293 BD 0.000 0.9600 0.1904 0.2491 
293 CD 0.010 1.7300 0.5453 0.2612 
293 ED 0.030 0.5600 0.0547 0.0725 
293 SD 0.270 1.0000 0.9022 0.1333 
293 LD 0.000 0.6700 0.0362 0.0951 
 
3.2 Correlation Analysis  
Table 3 shows statistical results of Pearson correlation coefficient of the variables. The correlation 
coefficient between ROA and ROE is 0.918, ROA and EPS is 0.422, indicates significant correlation, so 
separately test them. ROA and ROE are significantly positive related with DAR, LD, and ED at confidence level 
of 1%. It explains that these variables promote ROA and ROE. EPS is significantly positive related with BD at 
confidence level of 1%, indicates that bank borrowing promote on EPS. There was a significant correlation 
between the explanatory and control variables, but correlation coefficients are relatively small, so no 
multicollinearity exists. 
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Table 3.  Pearson correlation coefficient matrixes of variables 
      ROA ROE EPS DAR LD SD BD CD ED LNSIZE 
ROA Correlation 1          
Sig.(2-tailed)           
ROE Correlation .918** 1         
Sig.(2-tailed) .000          
EPS Correlation .422** .374** 1        
Sig.(2-tailed) .000 .000         
DAR Correlation .140** .454** .039 1       
Sig.(2-tailed) .001 .000 .381        
LD Correlation .221** .147** .026 .379** 1      
Sig.(2-tailed) .002 .001 .552 .000       
SD Correlation .137 .441 .035 .972** .167** 1     
Sig.(2-tailed) .625 .317 .428 .000 .000      
BD Correlation -.081 .054 .164** .473** .354** .421** 1    
Sig.(2-tailed) .065 .218 .000 .000 .000 .000     
CD Correlation .056 .052 .093* .007 -.166** .056 -.145** 1   
Sig.(2-tailed) .202 .236 .034 .866 .000 .202 .001    
ED Correlation .220** .116** .060 -.199** -.118** -.181** -.105* .137** 1  
Sig.(2-tailed) .000 .008 .172 .000 .007 .000 .017 .002   
LNSI
ZE 
Correlation -.467** -.484** .092* -.087* -.037 -.074 .030 .000 -.091* 1 
Sig.(2-tailed) .000 .000 .037 .048 .396 .094 .492 .999 .037  
**.Correlation is significant at confidence level of 0.01 (2-tailed) 
*. Correlation is significant at confidence level of 0.05 level(2-tailed) 
 
3.3 Analysis of regression results  
Table 4 lists the regression results of model 1. The R-value of ROA, ROE and EPS are 0.510, 0.667 and 
0.318 respectively; their F-values are 13.666, 31.101 and 14.380 respectively; it explains that entire equation is 
significant; D-W are close to 2 explain that the variables of equation are not exist autocorrelation, so the model 
1 is significant. The regression coefficients of DAR with ROA, ROE and EPS are 0.820, 0.815 and 0.843 
respectively, which is significantly related at confidence level of 1%, indicates that they are significantly 
positive correlated. Substitute the regression coefficient value of ROA, ROE and EPS into model 1 and take the 
derivative, obtain that ROA reached maximum when DAR equals to 50.98%, ROE reached maximum when 
DAR equals to 61.60%, and EPS reached maximum when DAR equals to 57.41%. We can derive that ROA, 
ROE, and EPS has "inverted U-shaped" relationship with DAR, so hypothesis H1 has been verified. 
Regarding to the result, we understand that the listed companies on GEM are all newly-rising SMEs, there 
are little company-paid and excessive consumption, and activities like “empire of the manager” has not occurred, 
so the incentive effect of debt financing has been greatly displayed. But too high assets-liability ratio has 
negative impacts on corporate governance, so there is an optimal debt financing ratio interval. 
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Table 4.  Regression coefficient of model 1 
Item ROA ROE EPS 
Constant 0.730
***
 
（11.111） 
1.060
***
 
（12.199） 
1.580
**
 
（2.479） 
DAR 0.820
***
 
（1.414） 
0.815
***
 
（1.451） 
0. 843
***
 
（1.977） 
2DAR  -0.209 ***  
（-2.98） 
-0.251
***
 
（-2.632） 
-0.242
***
 
（-1.987） 
Lnsize  -0.033 ***  
(-10.352) 
-0.049
***
 
（-11.716） 
0.108
***
 
（3.535） 
Indus  
No industry D, J, M, 
industry G is significant at 
confidence level of 1%. 
No industry D, J, M, industry G is 
significant at confidence level of 1%; 
F、L is significant at confidence level 
of 10%. 
No industry D, J, M, industry A, H are 
significant at confidence level of 5%, 
G is significant at confidence level of 
10%. 
R 0.510 0.667 0.318 
Adjust
2R  0.241 0.430 0.078 
D-W 1.812 1.815 1.825 
F 13.666
***
 31.101
***
 14.380
***
 
(Note: T test statistic is in the parentheses, *, **, *** denote significant at confidence level of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01) 
Regression results of model 2 are shown in Table 5. The regression coefficients between BD and ROA, 
ROE and EPS are 0.006, 0.027 and 0.177, which between CD and ROA, ROE and EPS are 0.003, 0.014 and 
0.029, the regression coefficient between BD and ROE, as well as CD and ROE are significant at confidence 
level of 5%, while BD and CD has no significant regression coefficient with ROA and EPS. So hypnosis H2 
about that bank borrowing and commercial credit rates are positively related with corporate performance can be 
partially accepted, and we can deem that they are weakly positive correlated. The regression coefficients 
between ED and ROA, ROE and EPS are 0.157, 0.213, and 0.817, and are significant at confidence level of 1%. 
It illustrates that other liabilities have significant positive impacts on corporate performance, then hypnosis H2 
about that other liabilities is positively related corporate performance has been verified. 
This empirical result can be explained as follows: At present, state-owned commercial banks of China 
don’t have enough driving force to participate in the corporate governance of the debtor company because of 
their unclear property rights. In order to guard against financial risks, China’s government does not encourage 
banks to do so. “Commercial Bank Law”, “Corporate Law” and other laws expressly limit the right of banks to 
participate in the debtor company’s corporate governance, so positive effect of bank debt financing is not 
obvious. Unlike most of the debt coming from bank borrowings for listed companies on main board market, the 
source of the debt for listed companies on GEM is mainly commercial credit. But companies which offer 
commercial credit have not supervised and regulated the debtor companies effectively, so it is unfavorable for 
improving their corporate performance. Therefore, commercial credit has positive effect but not significant. 
Regression results of model 3 are shown in Table 6. The regression coefficients of SD with ROA, ROE and 
EPS are -0.044, -0.243 and -0.130, and significant at confidence level of 1%. It illustrates that short-term debt 
has significant negative impacts on corporate performance, then hypnosis H3 about that short-term debt is 
negatively related with corporate performance has been verified. The regression coefficients of LD with ROA, 
ROE and EPS are 0.025, 0.146 and 0.270, but not significant. It illustrates that long-term debt has positive 
impacts on corporate performance but the influence is weak. We can accept the hypnosis H3 partially. 
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Table 5.  Regression coefficient of model 2 
Item ROA ROE EPS 
Constant 0.737
***
（11.265） 0.875
***
（8.832） -1.805
***
（-2.827） 
BD 0.006（0.475） 0.027
**
（1.325） 0.177（1.445） 
CD 0.003（0.261） 0.014
**
（0.729） 0.029（0.253） 
ED 0.157
***
（4.341） 0.213
***
（4.705） 0.817
***
（2.312） 
Lnsize -0.033
***
（-10.567） -0.053
***
（-11.439） 0.116
***
（3.850） 
Indus  
No industry D, J, M, industry 
F is significant at confidence 
level of 5%. 
No industry D, J, M, industry F, L are 
significant at confidence level of 5%; 
industry G, H are significant at 
confidence level of 10%.  
No industry D, J, M, industry A, H are 
significant at confidence level of 5%; 
industry K is significant at confidence 
level of 10%. 
R 0.534 0.555 0.350 
Adjust
2R  0.265 0.308 0.098 
D-W 1.855 1.826 1.852 
F 14.360
***
 16.016
***
 15.010
***
 
(Note: T test statistic is in the parentheses, *, **, *** denote significant at confidence level of 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01) 
The empirical result of model 3 can be explained as follows: high proportion of short-term debt of listed 
companies on GEM show their strong preference to short-term debt financing, which reflects short sight of the 
investors. Investors tend to overlook the long economic benefits by choosing projects with low gains and short 
payback period rather than the ones with high gains but long payback period. Commercial credit, one of the 
sources of short-term debt, doesn’t give full play to positive effects, and creditors of small short-term debt 
negatively participate in the debtor company’s corporate governance, so the contribution of short-term debt to 
corporation performance is negative. Usually, there are more restrictive clauses in the long-term debt financing 
contracts, especially for preventing managers from excessive investment, which will also play a role in 
supervising corporate operational activities. Because the average value of the proportion of long-term debt is 
lower than 10%, it couldn’t give full play to governance effects of debt financing, so their positive effect is not 
obvious. 
Table 6.  Regression coefficient of model 3 
Item ROA ROE EPS 
Constant 0.933
***
（9.027） 1.060
***
（12.134） -1.621
**
（-2.552） 
SD -0.044
***
（-2.784） -0.243
***
（-11.608） 0.130
***
（0.83） 
LD 0.025（0.381） 0.146（1.643） 0.270（0.419） 
Lnsize -0.033
***
（-10.429） -0.049
***
（-11.756） 0.108
***
（3.541） 
Indus  
No industry D, J, M, industry G 
is significant at confidence level 
of 1%, industry F is significant 
at confidence level of 10%. 
No industry D, J, M, industry G is 
significant at confidence level of 
1%, industry F is significant at 
confidence level of 10%. 
No industry D, J, M, industry A is 
significant at confidence level of 5%, 
industry G, H is significant at 
confidence level of 10%. 
R 0.510 0.659 0.316 
Adjust 
2R  0.242 0.419 0.077 
D-W 1.850 1.853 1.856 
F 13.688
***
 29.758
***
 14.311
***
 
(Note: T test statistic is in the parentheses, *, **, *** denote significant at confidence level of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01) 
From Table 4, 5 and 6, control variables of the three models reflect the following issues:  
 The coefficient between company size and ROA and ROE are significantly negative. It indicates that the 
larger scale of listed companies on GEM, the lower ROA and ROE. The coefficient between company size and 
EPS is significant positive; it indicates that the larger scale of listed companies on GEM, the higher EPS. There 
are more differences in coefficient between company size sand ROA, ROE and EPS, which suggests possibility 
of manipulating stock prices. 
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 In terms of control variables of the industry, some industries are affected significantly by industry 
environment, policies and other factors, such as transportation industry, warehousing industry, information and 
technology industry, and retail trade industry. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
In recent years the difficulty of debt financing for SMEs has attracted much attention from all quarters of 
the society, and all kinds of measures have been tried to solve that problem, the launch of GEM is a newly 
channel for newly-rising SMEs’ debt financing. This article tests governance effects of debt financing of listed 
companies on GEM from angles of total and different types of debt financing. Then we draw conclusions: 
corporate performance will increase first and then decrease along with the improvement of debt asset ratio. Bank 
loans, commercial credit and long-term loans have weak positive effects and other debt has significant positive 
effects on corporate performance, while short-term loans negatively influence corporate performance. 
There are many factors affect corporate performance, hence there are many ways to improve corporate 
value. On the basis of these studies, we propose firstly to strengthen the commercial creditor companies 
involving in the debtor companies’ corporate governance, forming an effective system of supervision and 
regulation to promote effects of debt financing governance. Secondly, listed company on GEM should adjust 
debt financing structure to improve use efficiency of debt, and choose capital source and structure reasonably 
according to its own scale and development. Properly increasing the proportion of long-term debt and making 
full use of debt financing is a better way to enhance corporate governance and improve corporate performance. 
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